7 August 2019

Why have humans so dismally failed to act on climate change? To a large extent, it’s because we’ve failed to step into the shoes of other species and of future generations. In the absence of empathy, we’re not motivated to consider the impact that our carbon-intensive lifestyles will have on others.

Empathy is one of the most powerful ways we have of escaping self-centred concerns and inspiring environmental action. Psychologists distinguish two kinds of empathy. There’s ‘affective’ empathy, in which you feel or mirror others’ emotions. And then there’s ‘cognitive’ empathy, in which you imagine what it’s like to be someone else: you take their perspective, complete with their experiences, beliefs, hopes, and fears.

This latter kind – cognitive empathy – is what economist and philosopher Adam Smith had in mind when he famously defined empathy as “changing places in fancy with the sufferer”.

Experimental studies have found that cognitive empathy actually has the effect of promoting ethical behaviour. When we look back at human history we can see that cognitive empathy has been a crucial force in the struggle for human rights, in overcoming historical forms of slavery, and in shifting social and political structures.

Today, in the midst of the sixth mass extinction – with an extraordinary 200 species going extinct every day, 1000 times the natural background rate – empathising with the suffering of other beings could be the catalyst we need to propel us to action. In the words of pioneering conservationist Rachel Carson, “The more clearly we can focus our attention on the wonder and realities of the universe around us, the less taste we shall have for destruction.”

Psychological research has shown us that we’re more likely to empathise with other species if we recognise the commonalities we share, and if we consider nature in general to be part of us.

Attributing human characteristics to non-human entities is called ‘anthropomorphism’, and it’s an outgrowth of our brains’ attunement to the intentions, thoughts and feelings of others. Humanising other beings in this way leads us to deem them worthy of our moral care and consideration. In this way, anthropomorphism can help us empathise with nature and make us want to act to protect it.

But some philosophers find anthropomorphism to be unhelpful. It can misdirect our thinking, distort our judgement and make us neglect larger scale risks or tragedies in favour of individual cases where we happen to find a strong emotional resonance. Another risk is that anthropomorphism might make us sentimentalise other species in ways that trivialise their inherent value.

In spite of these objections, many philosophers think that the capacity to imagine another’s life is in fact the basis for human morality.

Frans de Waal, who studies moral behavior in primates, explains that empathy is deeply rooted in our biology, originating in responses like body mimicry and emotional contagion. For this reason, empathising with humans comes naturally, but empathising with non-humans — or with humans of the future — can be much for difficult. In de Waal’s words: “our evolutionary background makes it hard for us to identify with outsiders.”

This leads to some serious problems with basing our morality on empathy. How should we treat those who are sufficiently different from us that we struggle to identify with them?

How should we treat those others whose concerns, on account of being distant from us in place or time, are too abstract for us to get an empathetic handle on?

Finally, how should we treat those others who demand to be treated in ways we don’t understand or don’t want for ourselves?