


TEACHING PHILOSOPHY ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY



INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES

Ankara 1998

INTRODUCTION

DAVID EVANS
and IOANNA KUÇURADI

The International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP) is the leading organisation for the promotion and development of Philosophy worldwide. Its Steering Committee (*Comité Directeur*) consists of forty philosophers from the international community. This committee's best known activity is to oversee the preparations for the World Congresses and International Conferences of Philosophy; and it also promotes a number of ongoing projects which are designed to sustain the activity of philosophy worldwide. One of these projects forms the remit of a sub-committee of the Steering Committee, which is called the Committee on Teaching Philosophy. This committee has operated since 1990. It has pursued its investigations with vigour and commitment and has built itself up to a membership of 25 persons from 18 countries.

The present volume is a fruit of the spirit of collaboration which the FISP Teaching Philosophy committee has fostered. Most of the essays are by members of the committee; and where this is not so, the author has been recommended by one of our members. The countries represented by our contributors are: Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, Peoples Republic of China, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.

So this volume conveys a genuinely global perspective on the issues which philosophers contemplate as they reflect on the practice and theory of teaching philosophy. The contributors were asked to bear in mind four themes as they attempted to focus their essay: Philosophy and the values of democracy; Teaching philosophy to other disciplines; Who should teach philosophy? and The place of philosophy in the wider curriculum. The intention was not to be prescriptive or restrictive; and it is a pleasure to see that how liberally the themes have been interpreted.

The relevance of teaching philosophy to the values of democracy is a major theme for anyone who reflects on the cultural significance of philosophical pedagogy. Democracy is the last prevailing ideology, and perhaps it will remain so. Those with long historical memory will recall Plato's severe strictures on the suitability of democratic decision-making to reach and preserve political truth. The essays of Matthew Lipman and of Menahem Luz and Niva Ariv address this issue from opposite perspectives. Lipman explores in considerable detail how the pedagogy of philosophy, particularly in relation to pre-adult persons, contains elements that are peculiarly suitable for the formation of democratic citizens. Luz and Ariv, on the other hand, maintain that the study of philosophy does not have a decisive effect in producing an adequately sceptical citizenry. Both views seem to be sustainable. Philosophical education is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for proper membership of a democratic community; it helps —indeed it helps greatly and even uniquely—but it provides no guarantee. That may still seem reason enough to invoke the essential need for education in philosophy for the whole community.

The importance of the teaching of philosophy as a means for the generating and maintaining the fabric of society also forms the theme of Yao Jiehou's essay. He charts the complex interactions between developments in the philosophical curriculum and the politico-economic ideology in his country. His analysis presents a rich mixture of issues that are internal to the academic study of philosophy, including the importance of preserving traditions, and matters that arise from the wider role of philosophy in social cohesion. This connects with the subject of Pieter du Toit, who explores the extent to which it is and is not feasible to retain elements of the most advanced forms of philosophical education in every cultural context. He argues for a cautious realism; high standards of philosophical reasoning and analysis must be attained and conserved, but there must also be respect for the cultural position of those who will receive the philosophical education.

The three following essays address the theme of teaching

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edited by
David Evans and Ioanna Kuçuradi

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Cover drawing: Metin Altıok, Ankara (1941-1993)

This book was published on the recommendation of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies with the financial assistance of UNESCO.

Copyright © 1998 by Editions of the Philosophical Society of Turkey for the International Federation of Philosophical Societies
Ahmet Rasim Sokak 8/4, Çankaya
06550 Ankara, Turkey

ISBN 975-7748-20-X

Printed by METEKSAN, Ankara, Turkey.

philosophy to those who are primarily engaged in other academic disciplines. Moses Akin Makinde emphasises the fundamental and universal position that philosophy occupies in the fabric of the academy and its work. A philosophical approach should permeate all intellectual investigation, and inevitably it does so; and an honestly constructed system of university study will embody due recognition of this fact. Martin Warner discusses interdisciplinary teaching involving philosophy and literature. This is a case of intellectual cross-fertilisation that should interest the whole community of philosophers, because of the venerable nature of the conflict which Plato diagnosed between these two forms of human experience. Warner's prescriptions for teaching contemporary students of philosophy and literature contain resonances, as he himself makes clear, for philosophical scholars of an ancient intellectual battle. Shokichi Uto describes his pedagogical method with students whose interest is not primarily philosophical. Patiently and with precision he takes us through the stages of his instruction, and indicates how the ambitions of such students could effectively be extended to the point that they might aspire to a place in the philosophical pantheon. All three of these essays provide firm support for those who would emphasise the centrality of philosophy in the work of universities.

But what is philosophy? Issues in the teaching of philosophy easily shade into the concerns of metaphilosophy; and this is entirely to be expected from the reflexive, self-conscious nature of the discipline. Dermot Moran examines one particular polarisation which has sometimes threatened to turn philosophy from one subject into many —or perhaps none. This is the division between analytic, or Anglo-American, and continental, or European, philosophy; and Moran explores with thoroughness what substance there is in the sense of schism and what hope for rapprochement. He urges us in the direction of the latter but makes it clear that this will be achieved only through hard work. In his essay Kuang-ming Wu explores another polarity, that between Western and Chinese philosophy. In the course of a very wide-ranging, indeed visionary review of the different styles of philosophical communication, he argues that philosophical 'inter-learning' must

be realised quickly and thoroughly on a global scale. These essays set a challenge to philosophers to look beyond any parochial walls within which they may shelter.

The next two essays discuss further topics in the teaching of philosophy, and once again the issues raised extend into metaphilosophy. Hung-yul So presents a systematic and detailed account of a successful course in teaching philosophy that exhibits its relevance to the widest social concerns. He argues that such a course provides an antidote against the disaffection that can otherwise strike philosophers and other intellectuals if they perceive philosophy to be ineffectual in dealing with pressing political or social concerns. Such disaffection is a form of cognitive dissonance; it must be addressed by using the resources of philosophy to address what is felt to be missing. Katalin Havas extends a similar plea for recognition of the intellectual capacity of young children. They have a sense of enquiry and wonder, she argues, that can too easily be expunged by the positions that philosophy is normally allocated—or in many countries' systems, not allocated—in the curriculum. Havas finds pungent illustration of her general thesis in the recent progress of the study of logic; and she concludes her essay with specific recommendations for teaching logic to children.

Finally the editors explore further topics in teaching and proper study of philosophy. David Evans examines a central issue in the teaching of introductory philosophy (at whatever level): should it start from what the students immediately perceive as problematic, or should it lead them into this terrain through the philosophical tradition or traditions? He argues that, as a pedagogical imperative, the first approach is definitely to be preferred; but he supplies an analytical device to support the introduction of the second approach at a later stage of the student's career. Ioanna Kuçuradi argues for a central role to be played by philosophers in the teaching of human rights, while also developing the importance of human rights in a scheme of universal ethics. Proceeding from a Kantian perspective, she maintains that a proper understanding of such rights essentially

involves an appropriate ethical and epistemological engagement on the part of the teacher; and this can only be supplied by philosophy. Following her theoretical discussion, she illustrates the approach by providing an outline of two model curricula for this form of philosophical education. These essays extend the link, already clear from earlier essays, between specific issues in teaching philosophy and metaphilosophical reflection on the nature of the study.

Our authors represent an exceptionally wide range of geographical and cultural styles of philosophy, and they all present their analysis in such a way as to make it very plain where they are coming from. At the same time each contribution speaks unmistakably to the concerns which are evinced in the others. And we have been impressed by the remarkable convergence of problems felt and of answers proposed.

It is hoped that this volume will generate both pleasure and instruction. Editing the material has been a complex as well as a rewarding task. The editors' thanks go, first, to all the contributors for their prompt submission of copy and ready willingness to answer queries and also to assign rights of stylistic revision. Essential secretarial and technological assistance was rendered, in Belfast, by Colette Casey, Catherine Reid and Malcolm Vincent, and in Ankara, by Nermin Yavral Gedik. We thank them as well. Last, but by no means least, we thank UNESCO for most valuable support.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

MATTHEW LIPMAN
New Jersey

1. *Preparing Students to Become Citizens of a Democracy*

This paper takes it more or less for granted that democracies, whatsoever the procedure or procedures by which they have come into being, are importantly shaped not simply by what they teach their future citizens about democracy in their civics courses, but by the ways they actively prepare those students, through having them participate in various forms of group inquiry, to become participants in the process of democracy itself. One might say, to employ a metaphor of instrumentalism, that the lathe on which the democracy-to-be is turned is equipped with a great many cutting tools, of which at least three are facets of the discipline of philosophy.

Facet #1 is philosophy as a horn of plenty overflowing with ill-formed and highly abstract but highly meaningful concepts available for careful examination. Philosophy is incredibly rich in highly general but highly controversial notions such as truth, justice and freedom, each lacking a satisfactory definition, yet apparently essential to that desirable state of affairs which democracies promise to be.

Facet #2 is a matter of education, for democracies are urgently in need of reflective citizenries, and philosophy as an educational force promises to lift the citizen's reflective processes to a level of higher-order thinking. Philosophy in this sense forms the armature of the educational process, whether in its primary, secondary, or tertiary phase, whether in its theoretical version or in its applied or practical, 'critical thinking' version. (More will be said further on about the relationship between philosophy and critical thinking, but perhaps it will be sufficient for the moment to differentiate between them by saying that philosophy

helps us think more deeply while critical thinking helps us think well.)

Facet #3 consists in the dialogical aspect of philosophy, taking the form of 'communities of philosophical inquiry'. The dialogical (or deliberative) aspect aims not just at a consensus of opinion but at a reasoned settlement of controversy that opens the door to the making of judgments.

In sum, Facet #1 represents philosophy's role in concept-formation and analysis; Facet #2 represents its role in the fostering of higher-order thinking; and Facet #3 represents its contribution to democratic deliberation. All three put themselves on display as *inquiry*. The particular significance of this is that philosophy immeasurably strengthens the epistemological dimension of democracy. It is important that democracy in the future make itself plausible by presenting itself not as a subject of reckless truth-claims but as a fallibilistic setting for the inquiry process. Once we see the goal assume the form of *democracy as inquiry*, the means for arriving at the goal fall more readily into place, and the role—or roles—of philosophy become considerably more clear.

To be sure, one must be alert to the ways in which some of the words employed here have in some respects retained the same meanings as they had in an earlier time, but in other respects have developed different meanings. This is the case with 'deliberation', which was classified as a form of inquiry even as far back as Aristotle. On the other hand, 'deliberation' is, for John Dewey,¹ an imaginative rehearsal of future activities on the part of an individual, whereas we today are more inclined to use the word as descriptive of the dialogue taking place within a group seeking closure or settlement, as with the deliberations of a jury.² Moreover, we are inclined these days to see a causal connection between the interpsychic thinking that occurs when a group deliberates and the intrapsychic thinking that occurs within the framework of an individual: we see the group's thoughtful conduct as the primary initiative, to be subsequently internalized

by each member of the group.

Another contextual change worth noting is that, a century and a half ago, leading educators were to be found arguing in favor of dropping the study of classic languages in favor of science education, the explanation being that an education in the methodology of science is more truly a liberal education. In contrast, today we note that, however valuable science education may be as a component of a liberal education, the criterion of 'education for democracy-qua-inquiry' sets up very special requirements that count in favor of philosophy as the core among the courses that have a democratizing effect in the countries within which they occur.

In referring here to 'education for democracy-qua-inquiry', there is no intention to limit the levels of education to the undergraduate or graduate levels, for the elementary and secondary levels of education are just as important and perhaps even more effective. This includes philosophy, for thousands of years restricted to college and university classrooms, only to appear suddenly, 'out of the blue', as a fully developed curriculum together with a pedagogy appropriate for use with children.³ John Rawls evidently has a knowledge-based civics course rather than philosophy in mind when he approvingly remarks that 'political liberalism ... will ask that children's education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime ...'.⁴ But philosophy rather than civics is needed, not just for the bits of important information it can transmit to the student in a democracy, but for the way it strengthens concept-formation and conceptual-analysis, reasoning and above all, judgment.⁵ Elementary/secondary school philosophy often uses narratives as texts and is taught by means of the 'community of inquiry' pedagogy. It will be referred to henceforth in this paper as 'Philosophy for Children'.

The democratic citizen needs to be a thinking citizen, but how is

such thinking best fostered? Some writers, appalled by the vastness of mass democracy, have drawn the line at 'critical thinking',⁶ while others, acknowledging the merits of critical thinking, have insisted that nothing less than philosophy is needed.⁷ It must be noted that while in some contexts they complement each other, more will need to be said about this comparison when the criteria for 'higher-order' thinking will be discussed.⁸

Still another relevant distinction to be touched upon is the one that holds between rationality and reasonableness. Here we can refer approvingly to John Rawls, for whom reasonable people 'desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept'.⁹ Rational agents lack the desire to engage in fair cooperation, their approach being psychopathic where their own benefit or profit is at stake. Thus we say of rational agents, that 'their proposal was perfectly rational ... but it was nevertheless highly unreasonable, even outrageous'.¹⁰ But this may be an extreme case; more often, the reasonable and the rational are complementary notions.¹¹ Thus, there is a certain plausibility to conceiving of critical thinking by itself as an enterprise exhibiting rationality, but when taken in interaction with creative and caring thinking, critical thinking can be understood as pursuing the goal of reasonableness.¹² Likewise, the criterion of higher-order thinking can be appropriate to both rationality and reasonableness, but it can also be appropriate to the discipline of philosophy.

2. Requirements of Democratic Practice

Not many educators have trouble with the notion that education needs to be employed to prepare students for (among other things) democratic citizenship. The matter becomes much more controversial when the question is raised as to the content of that education. For example, Israel Scheffler has been notably associated with the contention that education for democracy should contain a sizable component of science. First, Scheffler observes, consider the democratic ideal, which can be

summarized under five headings:

- a. reasoned procedures for the public review of policy;
- b. the freely given consent of a society to its arrangements;
- c. judgments of policy the common task of all, not the fixed privilege of a few, or of a class;
- d. no social blueprint considered to be immune to public scrutiny; and
- e. continuous critical and responsible inquiry into social matters. Note the prominence that Scheffler ascribes to the role of inquiry in a democratic society. And he rightly contends that a proper education for sustaining these democratic values would be an education that prepared the mind of the student to carry out inquiry. It doesn't shape and mold the student's mind: it opens it. So it is that a free and open democracy displays the values of inquiry persistently and pervasively carried through. The merits of an education suitable for democracy would therefore have to be, Scheffler insists, that it:
 - a. liberates the mind;
 - b. strengthens the mind's critical powers;
 - c. informs the mind with knowledge;
 - d. engages the mind's human sympathies; and
 - e. illuminates its moral and practical choices.¹³

The doctrines of both science and democracy, Scheffler continues are to be held 'for reasons' rather than arbitrarily. All competent individuals are expected to survey such reasons and judge them, fairly and comprehensively, on their merits.

This seems to be the direct point of contact between science and democracy, for Scheffler: skill in judging reasons. Presumably science prepares one in that skill, which is indispensable in a well-functioning democracy. But before we assent to Scheffler on this point, two questions need to be addressed to him: (a) Are the reasons one judges in science similar to the reasons one has to be able to judge in a democracy? And (b) Is there no other discipline which might be able to prepare students to judge reasons at least as competently as science?

With regard to the first question, it can be doubted that we are talking about the same kind of reasons in the same kind of context. Is it not the case that the reasons to be judged in scientific contexts are mainly *explanatory reasons*, while those to be judged in political contexts are mainly, in contrast, *justificatory reasons*? Additionally, is science the only discipline that can prepare future citizens of a democracy to judge reasons, or is philosophy in at least as good a position to do so?

A contemporary writer on democratic theory, James Fishkin, suggests that there are three essential conditions for the fulfilling of our ideal image of democracy. These conditions are political equality, the absence of tyranny, and deliberation. Why deliberation? Because without it, democratic choices are not exercised in a meaningful way. If the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, they lose their claim to political authority over us. Deliberation is necessary if the claims of democracy are not to be de-legitimated'.¹⁴ This quotation rightly stresses the importance of deliberation to democratic practice. Without such emphasis, we would find it difficult to estimate the need, in education, for democracy, for an understanding of and practice in political deliberation.

The difference between rationality and reasonableness cannot be spelled out once and for all, for these concepts are inherently fuzzy. Nevertheless it is possible to note that, for the most part, reasonableness must have certain characteristics that rationality may need but not possess. One way to put this would be to say that reasonableness is rationality tempered by self-criticism, deliberation and judgment. The requirement of reasonableness is particularly applicable to deliberations. As Rawls points out, political deliberations are governed by these precepts:

- a. They aim to reach reasonable agreement: it is clearly unreasonable to accuse others of prejudice or bias without compelling grounds.
- b. It is reasonable to expect intractable disagreements on basic questions.

*Difference
rational
by itself*

- c. It is reasonable to credit others with good faith, in spite of disagreement.

Rawls is particularly insistent on the need for realism when it comes to deliberation. We should realize that agreement on important judgments often cannot be reached even by conscientious and reasonable persons, and even after free discussion.¹⁵ Rawls asks that we be tough-minded enough to concede four other 'general facts':

- a. Not only are democracies pluralistic, but they involve a diversity of comprehensive doctrines that are fully in conflict with one another.
- b. Political community is not 'natural' and can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power.
- c. A majority of active citizens is needed to support any democratic regime.
- d. The political culture of a democracy is not transparently intelligible, but contains certain fundamental ideas which are thoroughly intuitive.

These grim facts about democracies, far from limiting the value of deliberation, make it all the more essential.¹⁶

3. *The Mechanisms of Public Deliberation*

What are the conditions that prepare the way for deliberation? One such condition might be the decline of argumentation among those who assume an adversary stance towards one another, and its replacement with the understanding that deliberation is inquiry, so that those who deliberate together are co-inquirers. The originator of this way of construing the nature of deliberation is Aristotle, who asserts, 'deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing'.¹⁷ This is a bold move, to assume that all deliberation is inquiry, for it accords a status to deliberation that is out of the question for mere conversation. Aristotle's proposal makes it possible for us to realize that inquiry, far from being a mere ornament in a democracy is, or has become, an essential condition of it. Just as a person cannot be considered reasonable if that person is lacking in self-criticism, so a society cannot be

considered democratic if inquiry in that society is not prevalent.

If Aristotle's remark audaciously redefines what it means for a society to call itself democratic, we should ask ourselves what other dialogical mechanisms there are that restructure a problematic situation and thereby throw light on the matter of public deliberation. It would be worth our while to take account of five of these mechanisms as cited by James Bohman:

a. *Making implicit reasons explicit.* Very often, the justification of our practices and institutions lies latent in our common understandings and shared intuitions. These concealed justifications need to be brought out into the open, and this is the work of both those who have consented to the practices in question and those who have dissented from them. Shared practices require publicly convincing reasons, and public deliberation is a way of making such reasons explicit, so as to determine if they are fully convincing.

b. *Showing the relevance of life experience.* Dialogues often range back and forth over differences in biographical and collective historical experiences. Groups protesting their lack of full enfranchisement cite their life stories, which often pertain to matters of race, gender or class. In so doing, such groups challenge the assumptions of what had hitherto been taken as normal.

c. *Dialogue taking the guise of a discourse of application.* A dialogue can be described as a 'discourse of application' when it touches on the problem of applying a given principle to a particular case. Thus, for example, a controversy will be engendered with regard to whether a particular act falls under the rubric of a right. The resulting deliberation may throw light on what the reasons were for asserting the principle in the first place.

d. *Articulating vague and abstract concepts and relationships.* Articulation aims to turn that which appears to be vague and abstract into something richer and more comprehensive. For instance, means and ends can be meticulously examined to see how they can be made to mesh more effectively.

e. *Taking the perspectives and attitudes of others.* This becomes

an important component of deliberation when the expert finds it difficult to relate to the experience of the ordinary citizen, or when the ordinary citizen has difficulty taking the position of what G. H. Mead has called the 'generalized other'.¹⁸

These mechanisms of public deliberation in a democracy are only a few, but they are representative of the sorts of things deliberation can accomplish. Moreover, they have always been characteristic of philosophical dialogue. Consequently, they can be taken as a sample of the evidence that philosophical practice prepares one for democratic practice.

Philosophical practice cannot rest content with bringing out the opinions of the participants in a dialogue: it must seek to bring out their reasons as well. Approval cannot be given to those opinions while withholding approval from the reasons or arguments that are said to justify such opinions. The same criterion holds with regard to democratic deliberations. It is insufficient merely to elicit popular opinions on matters of public concern. The public needs to be made aware of such insufficiency so that as a matter of course it makes explicit the reasons for its opinions and assesses them.¹⁹

It would be a mistake to assume that 'philosophical practice' is limited to the experience one has of philosophy at the tertiary level. 'Philosophical inquiry' is inclusive of dialogue and deliberation as well as of listening to lectures and writing theses. Moreover, there is now a branch of philosophical inquiry that is operative at the elementary school level. If Bohman's 'dialogical mechanisms' are operative at this level, it would be strong evidence for relying on philosophy (inclusively at all levels) to prepare future citizens for democratic deliberations. As a matter of fact, these mechanisms do operate when philosophical inquiry is conducted at the elementary school level:

a. *Making implicit reasons explicit.* In Philosophy for Children, students read fictional texts permeated with philosophical reasonings and judgments, and they discuss and analyze these texts in subsequent classroom dialogue. Implicit reasons are

among the meanings such discussions elicit.

b. *Showing the relevance of life experience.* Children excel at offering to illustrate abstract principles by citing personal data or life experiences.

c. *Discourses of application.* Elementary school philosophy students are frequently given instances of universal and particular premises and asked what conclusions can legitimately be drawn from them, as part of their study of validity in reasoning.

d. *Concrete articulation of vague and abstract meanings.* While children's preference for the concrete over the abstract has been overstated, it is nevertheless possible to get them to exemplify abstractions and to express concretely how they think these abstractions guide or affect their lives.

e. *Taking the perspectives of others.* Children are very adept at role-playing. On less conscious levels, they readily assume the attitudes of those who play the role of significant others in their lives. They also find no difficulty in 'making believe' they are things or animals as well as people. As children grow, they become increasingly adept at taking the perspectives of others as a powerful skill or tool in their engagement in ethical inquiry.

While reason-giving is an important matter for deliberation, just as deliberation is an important aspect of democracy, it cannot be forgotten that the chief bridge connecting philosophy to democracy is thinking. It is because democracy cannot flourish if its citizens are uncritical, thoughtless and uncaring that it is necessary to stimulate the thinking of future citizens while they are still children. Democracies need citizens who think, and the supply of thinking adults can be best assured if there is no shortage of thinking children.

4. *Teaching for Higher-Order Thinking by Means of Philosophy*

The goal of education for democracy must be specified further, if we are to facilitate its happening. The questions to be raised include the following:

a. Is it enough to specify that there must be education for

thinking, or must 'education for higher-order thinking' be required?

- b. Is it enough to specify 'education for critical thinking' as sufficient for the future citizens of a democracy, or must philosophy be the component to be added?
- c. Is it enough to recommend simply that all citizens of a democracy need philosophy, or must elementary and secondary school philosophy be mandated no less than philosophy at the tertiary level?

The argument that mass democracies cannot be satisfied with anything less than education for higher-order thinking can be attributed to Lauren Resnick. She defines such thinking as non-algorithmic, complex, effortful, and involving multiple criteria, multiple solutions, nuanced judgment, uncertainty, self-regulation, and the imposition of meaning. Now, Resnick does not identify higher-order thinking with either critical or philosophical thinking: any thinking that satisfies these nine criteria would be classified by her as the sort of thinking that citizens in a mass democracy need to engage in.²⁰

An alternative definition of higher-order thinking one that makes it a combination of critical, creative and caring thinking thereby puts it decisively beyond the reach of critical thinking alone. Whether it puts higher-order thinking beyond the reach of philosophy as well remains to be seen.

In *Thinking in Education*, I put the matter this way: 'The capacity of philosophy, when properly reconstructed and properly taught, to bring about higher-order thinking in education (is) significantly greater than the capacity of any alternative approach'.²¹ We know that citizens of a democracy must place a high premium upon democratic values like self-government, freedom, justice and the rule of law if they are to contribute to the successful functioning of that democracy. Likewise, students in school must place a high premium upon the component values of higher-order thinking if the schools to which those students belong can be considered to be doing their job successfully.

If we agree that higher-order thinking is a shorthand way of describing the kind of thinking that schools must elicit from the future citizens of democracies, what are the component values of this instrumentality we are calling higher-order thinking? If we provisionally accept the afore-mentioned triad of critical, creative and caring thinking, how are we to break these down into their component values? Here are some suggestions.

a. *Critical thinking*

- (i) *Thinking aimed at the eventual production of judgments.* In other words, applied or practical thinking, thinking that uses theoretical knowledge to arrive at settlements, decisions, choices, compromises, solutions and other kinds of judgments. In this sense, the professions (e.g., medicine, law, engineering, etc.) and the arts (e.g., architecture, music, painting, sculpture, etc.) are model instances of critical thinking, in that every instance of medical treatment, for example, and every instance of painterly or musical composition is a series of practical judgments.
- (ii) *Thinking guided by criteria.* The model examples here are the works of critics, of judges and panels of judges, as well as any others who are not thinking by rote or by rules. So dominant is 'thinking guided by criteria' that it is often identified, in the popular understanding, with the thinking of critics, such as art or music or drama critics, or of judges, such as judges in sports contests.
- (iii) *Thinking that is self-corrective.* The first step in this direction is to commit oneself or one's group to fallibilism: the acknowledgment that one has probably made mistakes in one's thinking. The second step is to look for ways of correcting those mistakes.
- (iv) *Thinking that is contextual.* Critical thinking resists taking portions of events or works out of context and ascribing them meanings different from the meanings they carry in the context. The individuality of each situation has to be taken into account and allowed to play a guiding role in any inquiry into that situation.²²

While it cannot be claimed that these components of many

instances of critical thinking are non-overlapping and exhaustive of the domain, they are met with frequently enough to be rather persistently expected. Critical thinking is a fairly huge family of many types of thinking, and the four factors listed above are features that members of this particular family of thinking often have in common.

For example, there is critical thinking across the skills, examples of which would be critical reading, critical writing, critical speaking and critical listening. Then there is critical thinking across the disciplines, examples of which would be critical history, critical anthropology, critical sociology and critical philosophy. These are schools of each of the disciplines cited, although each of the schools generally claims to be exhaustive of the entire discipline of which it is only a school. In addition, there are the various criticisms: art criticism, literary criticism, film criticism, music criticism, and so on. What each of these families has most in common (and what makes all of them, taken together, into one still larger family) is their proclivity for self-correction. The importance ascribed here to self-correction has to do with the fact that self-correction is an outcome of thinking about thinking, or, more to the point, of thinking critically about thinking. Such thinking appeals to such regulative ideas as Truth and Meaning, and to such working criteria as accuracy, validity, integrity, soundness, and correctness.

b. Creative thinking

There do not appear to be any invariant features of creative thinking which are not at the same time synonymous with creative thinking. On the other hand, it is possible to identify some of the features or parameters that are often met with, and are therefore representative of the forms that creative thinking is likely to take. Here are some of them:

- (i) *Imaginative*. Proposes detailed sketches of possible worlds (e.g., works of art, historical reconstructions, astronomical narratives, etc.).
- (ii) *Originative*. Invents products for which there are no clear precedents, but only contributing strands at most. Great

inventions are like this.

- (iii) *Productive*. Generates meritorious works and acts in quantities.
- (iv) *Independent*. Rejects conventional solutions and positions; creators think for themselves.
- (v) *Holistic*. Deeply concerned about atypical part-part and part-whole relationships; contextualistic; thinks situationally.
- (vi) *Self-transcending*. More discontented with what one has already done oneself than with what others have done. Works are to be compared more with one's earlier or future works than with the works of one's contemporaries.
- (vii) *Maieutic*. Helps bring to birth; helps beget.

These characterizations of the thinking of the creative person do no more than scratch the surface of creative thinking. They throw notoriously little light on what are, at the least, typical idiosyncrasies of human thought and at the most, works of barely comparable grandeur.

It is unthinkable that what goes by the name of 'higher-order thinking' should be exemplified only by critical thinking. The citizens of the democracies of the future should not be taught to be indifferent to creative thinking. They can learn that critical and creative thinking exemplify the relationship to one another of the similar and the different, while on the other hand they exemplify the relationship to each other of elements of analogical reasoning. Another illustration of their relationship to one another has to do with problem situations, for on the one hand critical thinking formulates the problem which is resolved by creative thinking, and on the other hand creative thinking formulates the problem which is subsequently resolved by critical thinking.

c. Caring thinking

If the regulative idea of critical thinking is *truth* (or applicability or workability) and if the regulative idea of creative thinking is *meaning* (or wholeness or integrity), then the regulative idea of caring thinking is *value* (or importance or relevance). Each of these terms is so plurisignificant that it is difficult to see them unambiguously in the above comparison.

Just as it may be helpful to connect each kind of thinking with a different regulative idea, so it may be helpful to connect each kind with its negative. Thus, we can say that higher-order thinking needs to be critical, creative and caring because we cannot afford to have it uncritical, uncreative and uncaring, or indiscriminating, mechanical and emotionally indifferent.

Certainly democracies need citizens who are sensitive to matters of importance (i.e., to things that matter, to values), who feel deeply about such matters, and whose thinking about them is studded with judgments. For example, if art matters, then those who care about it express themselves in appreciative terms, those who want to evaluate it express themselves in terms of art criticism, and those who are inspired by it express themselves creatively.²³ Or, to offer another example, a person in love may feel called upon to write a love letter, in which case his or her thinking critically need not be ruled out, his or her thinking creatively might well be desirable, but his or her thinking caringly is utterly essential.

To care for an object need not distort one's thinking about that object (the way alcohol distorts one's perceptions and, consequently, the way one drives an automobile). Instead, caring helps us and understand what otherwise was considered too unimportant for us to notice. Caring intensifies and focuses our thinking about what we care about.

Caring is a domain without a central cosmopolis. Instead, it sports countless districts, a few of which are listed here:

- (i) *Curatorial*: Taking care of works of art, souls, students.
- (ii) *Preservative*: Involved in protecting, maintaining, saving.
- (iii) *Restorative*: Involved in healing, remediating, restitution.
- (iv) *Nurturant*: Involved in fostering, promoting, training, nourishing.
- (v) *Celebratory*: Involved in honoring, praising, commemorating, observing.
- (vi) *Empathic*: Imaginatively participates in the experiences of others.

- (vii) *Appreciative*: Involves cherishing (of treasured things), respecting (of rational beings), appreciating (whatever is beautiful), admiring (whatever is virtuous), being considerate (of whatever is sentient).
- (viii) *Ethical*: Concerned with whatever is experienced as good or right and their grounds or reasons. It hardly needs pointing out that caring thinking involves thinking that is appropriate to the situation in which one finds oneself. It is not directly connected to the sense in which care is a burden that weighs one down, that makes one careworn, etc. Caring thinking is selective, discriminating thinking, thinking that accords what one thinks about, as one thinks about it, just the respect or disrespect, honor or dishonor, admiration or contempt, that it deserves.

It should be kept in mind that these sub-domains do not define the nature of caring. Instead, it is the distinctive nature of caring which carves out these particular sub-domains. In other words, caring thinking distinguishes what is cared for from what is not cared for. Nevertheless, what a caring person values has its own value, its own way of mattering, its own integrity.

If critical thinking should turn out to be the path to the school in which higher-order thinking is emphasized, then the breakdown of critical, creative and caring thinking into the sorts of sub-domains I have listed above would make sense. Critical thinking at least in the way it has generally been taught is something one has recourse to in an emergency, or when a problem asserts itself and conventional modes of thought are too imprecise, too inaccurate, too illogical. But such analyses are unnecessary in the case of philosophy. Philosophy attempts to be ready for any problem that might conceivably develop. It has rich traditions of aesthetic and ethical thought: it does not need to be reminded that people are constantly experiencing moral crises and desperately need help. At the same time, it can deal with anything that critical, creative and caring thinking can deal with.

It has been contended, in the preceding pages, that the community

of inquiry is a remarkable pedagogical instrument, to be employed in the effective teaching of higher-order thinking. It lends itself to use both for philosophical and for critical thinking. Furthermore, it prepares students even elementary school students for successful deliberation such as will be needed by adults in a democratic society.

The two questions that remain to be treated are these: 'What is the community of inquiry?' and 'What evidence is there that deliberation can make the difference between desultory democracy and successful democracy?'. These questions can now be discussed.

5. *The Role of the Community of Deliberative Inquiry*

The community of inquiry is a pedagogical instrument that is especially useful for the teaching of higher-order thinking, whether critical or philosophical. In appearance it resembles a classroom discussion, but the teacher is usually aware of criteria that can be used to lift the process well above what usually takes place in more routine classroom conversations.²⁴ Some of these criteria can be in this sort of sequence:

- a. *Establishment of a suitable mental state.* This is done, in Philosophy for Children, by having the class read aloud (taking turns, a paragraph apiece) from specially written novels or stories which depict a classroom community of children engaged in philosophical inquiry. To the extent that the live children identify with the fictional children, they assume the mental state of the fictional children.
- b. *Identification with fictional children in the performance of mental acts.* If the reader sees a sentence like this: 'From his mother's facial expression and the shaking of her voice, Joe gathered that his mother was quite angry with him'. The very young reader may not be familiar with the verb 'gathered that', but if she groups Joe's observations together with Joe's conclusion, she may be able to engage in the same mental act of 'gathering' that Joe engaged in.
- c. *Identification with fictional children in the assumption of*

propositional attitudes. If the reader sees a sentence like this: 'Joe decided that the capital of Australia was Sydney', he can perform the mental act of entertaining the assertion, 'The capital of Australia is Sydney', as well as the mental act of deciding that the statement about Sydney is true.

- d. *Identification with other children in the class in their performance of speech acts and inquiry acts.* Suppose Dorothy begins the classroom discussion by asking a question aloud. Her performance of a speech act encourages the other students to think that they too can comment aloud. And the fact that she asked a question encourages the others to think that they can question too, and that they needn't wait to be called on just to answer the teacher's questions.
- e. Certain oft-repeated combinations of mental acts, like certain juxtapositions of attitudes and speech acts, give rise to the acquisition of certain rudimentary inquiry skills. For example, Sam is at the point of expressing his opinion, but then recalls that others who have done so have always been asked to supply a reason. Sam thereupon expresses his opinions *and* at the same time offers a reason to support it.
- f. The students scour what they have read, in search of problematic observations by the fictional characters, or puzzling events in the text. These are disconnected experiences, giving rise to disconnected thoughts and feelings. The students report these disconnected fragments of experience.
- g. The students also report thoughts and observations that connect with one another, with the result that thinking behaviors are distributed among the students and are not just in the minds of each.
- h. The teacher records the questions on the chalkboard and numbers them.
- i. By voting democratically, the students convert the list of questions into an agenda that reflects their own interest in the proposed items.
- j. Each student in the classroom internalizes the distributed thinking of the group, and reflects on what has been internalized, in the context of what the group has read and

what it has said about what it read.

- k. Students who now interconnect what they have seen, heard, read and thought in short, what they have internalized are in a position to ask more searching questions and to make more trenchant comments in short, to externalize what they have put together in their own thinking.
- l. Since the text depicts the fictional children attempting to deal with logical, aesthetic and ethical problems (as well as many other types), the children who identify with them begin to explore similar issues by means of thinking activities that become rapidly more specialized as critical, creative and caring thinking.
- m. As the discussion develops in the classroom, areas of disagreement emerge and controversies ensue. Students become aware that they are engaged in dialogue rather than in mere conversation, in that dialogue represents progressive inquiry and the development of a product, such as a settlement of opinion, or judgment.
- n. Each student may begin the discussion with the expectation of what would be, from his point of view, a *rational* conclusion, meaning a victory for his way of seeing the matter. But as the participants begin to engage in a *deliberation*, they find themselves prepared to accept a *reasonable* compromise. Such a solution represents (a) a compromise without anyone's having to sacrifice his or her integrity, and (b) the readiness of each to cooperate with all the rest by accepting a fair settlement if all the rest do likewise.²⁵
- o. While each community of inquiry develops differently, much as human individuals do, they eventually find their way to the fostering of thinking (and higher-order thinking at that), of reasoning and judgment, of reasonable deliberation and judgment, and of preparing the participants for life in an inquiry-oriented democracy.

These fifteen criteria may be seldom found in any particular instance of a community of inquiry, but any instance will likely manifest some of them. Experience can teach us what number of them can constitute a quorum of criteria. They are spelled out here (as many more can be spelled out) simply so that they should

be recognizable when encountered. They are therefore what Kant would likely call 'provisional' or 'anticipatory' criteria.

Communities of deliberative inquiry are microcosms of democracy not simply because they are self-governing groups but because their modes of self-regulation and self-correcting can be carried over from the smaller groups to the more massive societies. The eventual integration of participants from the smaller, classroom communities into the nation-wide or global societies may result in an increase in methodological purity on both sides. Thus, the continuous absorption by a democratically-oriented society of cohorts from the schools all steeped in inquiry procedures, can only mean, down the road a bit, that democracies of the future will be more and more attuned to higher-order thinking and higher-order deliberation. As Gutmann and Thompson put it: in any effort to make democracy more deliberative, the single most important institution outside government is the educational system. To prepare their students for citizenship, schools must go beyond teaching literacy and numeracy, though both are of course prerequisites for deliberating about public problems. Schools should aim to develop their students' capacities to understand different perspectives, communicate their understandings to other people, and engage in the give-and-take of moral argument with a view to making mutually acceptable decisions. These goals, which entail cultivating moral character and intellectual skills at the same time, are likely to require some significant changes in traditional civics education, which has neglected teaching this kind of moral reasoning about politics.²⁶

6. *The New Significance of the Deliberation Poll*

To what extent is all this talk about deliberation merely ideological rhetoric and to what extent can it be pinned down to specific practices and results? Let us consider what Robert Dahl (no innocent in these matters) proposes as a 'process of public enlightenment'.²⁷ This is not for the purpose of initiating policy proposals, but it would come into play after the standard institutions have failed. There are five stages:

Stage I A non-partisan commission of experts on the problem at hand would come up with three or four major alternative solutions and their long-run costs. The commission would not recommend a solution, but would gather and report the relevant information.

Stage II At roughly the same time, a scientifically selected sample of about six hundred citizens would deliberate for about a week on the commission's report. This group's procedures would follow those of James Fishkin's 'Deliberative Poll'. The citizens break into small discussion groups, meet with experts and politicians, and form their conclusions. They actually learn something. Their choices, if they are representative, are those that other Americans would be likely to make if they had the same opportunity to deliberate over the issues. And this would make their judgments more difficult for politicians to ignore.

Stage III At the same time, similar exercises would take place in selected localities throughout the country. Somewhere between twenty-five and fifty-thousand citizens would be involved, developing more informed opinions and acquiring a higher level of interest. This could develop a critical mass of informed citizens on this particular issue.

Stage IV A period of vigorous public debate would follow. The Deliberative Poll would provide reliable evidence as to how ordinary citizens respond to the choices laid out for them.

Stage V The president would meet with congressional leaders to negotiate a long-run solution.

According to Dahl, 'Experience so far shows that by the end of their meetings many of the participants arrive at judgments significantly different from those they held at the outset'.²⁸ Their judgments are more enlightened than they would have been without the Poll. Furthermore, their judgments are what any other representative group of citizens would probably make if they had the same opportunity to deliberate over the issues.

This is the key to the matter. It is not simply that these representative citizens become more enlightened, but that they become more *reasonable* and not merely more rational. They become more ready to accept a society-wide cooperative

solution, provided that they are assured that their fellow citizens will accept the same solution rather than continue to hold rigidly to the same uninformed opinions they had held in the past.

What then can we say about the relationship between philosophy and democracy? At least this: that when philosophy is taught as inquiry, in communities of deliberative inquiry, and especially when the students are children, the chances are that they will emerge from their courses more enlightened and more reasonable than they were when they entered upon such studies. In this, they already are what we would want our adult citizens to be. Their presence in larger and larger numbers would become critical for the character of the society as a whole. They would be ready to give reasons for their opinions, and to replace weaker reasons with stronger ones. They would be able to justify their distrust of authoritarian, non-egalitarian practices and institutions. The democracies they lived in would continue to change, but such change would be guided in each citizen by reasonableness rather than by a set of values that dogmatically gives priority, whatever the issue, to one's self.

Notes

- ¹ Cf. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922). New York: Henry Holt and Company, pp. 189-198.
- ² For the jury as an example of deliberative dialogue, see Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education* (1991). New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 238-240.
- ³ One of the earliest rationales for elementary school philosophy is to be found in Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp and Frederick S. Oscanyan (Eds.) *Philosophy in the Classroom* (1980). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- ⁴ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (1993). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 199.
- ⁵ See Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, *op. cit.* pp. 40-46, for a consideration of some of the ways in which philosophy strengthens cognitive skills.
- ⁶ A judicious review is offered by Lauren B. Resnick and Leopold E. Klopfer in *Toward the Thinking Curriculum: Current Cognitive Research* (1989). Alexandria, VA: ASCD. For a brief consideration of critical thinking as the most effective method of teaching thinking, see Alec Fisher, "Critical

- Thinking", in *Teaching Thinking: A Survey of Programmes in Education*, edited by M. J. Coles and W. D. Robinson (1991). London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., pp. 49-58.
- 7 The beginnings of a case for the role of philosophy in elementary school education are made by Matthew Lipman, *Philosophy Goes to School* (1988). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- 8 One of the initial arguments for the value to democracies of higher-order thinking is to be found in Lauren B. Resnick, *Education and Learning to Think* (1987). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. See also, Matthew Lipman, "Moral Education, Higher-Order Thinking and Philosophy for Children" (1994), in *Early Child Development and Care*, Vol. 107, pp. 61-70.
- 9 Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 48. Rawls cites with approval an earlier article on the same distinction by W. M. Sibley, "The Rational Versus the Reasonable", *Philosophical Review* (October 1953), pp. 554-560.
- 11 Rawls, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 12 An earlier version of this approach was offered in Matthew Lipman, "Caring as Thinking", in *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines*, Vol No. 1, Autumn 1995, pp. 1-13.
- 13 Israel Scheffler, *Reason and Teaching* (1973). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Chapter One.
- 14 James Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation* (1991). New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 29.
- 15 John Rawls, "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus", (1993) in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roehmer (Eds), *The Idea of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 249.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 246-47.
- 17 *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Chapter 9, 1142a - 1142b.
- 18 James Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy* (1996). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 59-65.
- 19 See Martin Benjamin, *Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics* (1990). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, for the viewpoint of an expert in philosophical pedagogy with regard to the search for compromise without loss of integrity in matters under deliberation.
- 20 Resnick, *Education and Learning to Think*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
- 21 Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 22 For more on these criteria of critical thinking, see Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-125.
- 23 Elizabeth Anderson examines some of the varieties of valuing in her *Value in Ethics and Economics* (1993). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See, in particular, pp. 10-11.
- 24 The criteria suggested here for identifying the formation of a

- community of inquiry can be contrasted with the criteria listed in *Thinking in Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-243.
- 25 Cf. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-54.
- 26 Gutmann and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
- 27 Robert Dahl, "On Deliberative Democracy", *Dissent*, Summer 1997, p. 56.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 57. Dahl's enthusiasm for the potential of Fishkin's Deliberation Poll to produce significant improvement in the political enlightenment of the voters in a democracy should not be taken lightly. If the Poll can be as successful as Dahl thinks it can be, and if philosophy can be as successful in preparing future voters as philosophers think it can be, there may be some reason for optimism regarding the course education for democracy is likely to take in the next few decades.

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